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FINAL ~.llIl!ATI ON

Jurisprud en ce
August, 1971

Mr. Bahr

The examination consists of four questions of varying weight, totaling 100
Ea:h pr~blem states the 'veight to be given to such problem and a
sugg:sted t~e l~mit. The suggested time lLmits are based solelY on a proport~on of the total time for the entire examination equal to t he percentage
weight given to individual problems . Ans\'ler all ~uestions. Do not put your
name on your bluebook. Be sure that your examination number appears on all
bluebooks used.
.

po~nts.

****
1.

Weight :

30 - Time :

54 minutes

In the case of Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I. 477 , 479 (1881), the court said,
by t1atteson, J.:
"Under it (the conditional sale) the vendee [purchaser] acquires
not only the right of possession and use~ but the right to become
the absolute owner upon complying \,iith the terms of the contract.
These are rights of \-]hich no act of the vendor [seller) can divest
him 9 and which, in the absence of any stipulation in the contract
restraining him , he can transfer by sale or mortgage. Upon performance of the conditions of the sale , the title to the property vests
in the vendee, or in the event that he has sold , or mortgaged it~ in
his vendee, or mortgagee , without further bill of sale •.• . These rights
constitute an ~ctual , present interest in the property, 'vhich, as we
have seen abc.ve , is capable of transfer by sale or mortgage. It
P~alyze and discuss.
II. toJ'eight :

20 - Time :

36 minutes .

rlEven if sometimes bewildered by technical detail, plagued by woodenness of administration , or outr aged by cynical la~ryer ' s trading on the fact
that a given matter turns " not on justice , but on law,1i no man can wrestle
long ,vith the things of law without becoming aware that under the very things
which sometimes bewi lder , plague or outrage him there pulses an urge for
right, or decency , or justice ~ a drive tOl-Jard an ideal attribute which· men ·
may well conceive as a proper and indeed the proper ultimate objective of all
law and of all legal institutions . The concept of Natural La,,, seems to me an ·
expression informed by this urge and directed to its greater reali zation ; yet
an expression only partially pffective. because baffled in~ part as it mov~s
toward realization, Bnf rleli by the ver.y legal. technique ldliciH its objective ·
is to criticize and remedy. Il
.
Discuss.
III • Weight :

30 - Time:

54 minutes

". • • . the fact that judges and officials are not wholly free and must not be .
wholly free~ divides on analysis and closer examination into t\..ro facts. The one
fact . is concerned ,v.lth the control~ the restraint~ the holding down, of judges
and officials; the other fact is concerned with the allowing to them of a limited
degree and a limited kind of lee,·my, and the putting on them. of a duty to exercise their utmost skill and judgment wit.hin that leeway. Both of these facts
must be seen, and both must be reckoned \vith, by any Jurisprudence Hh1ch aims
to cover the plain facts and the settled policies of our legal system. For there
are two kinds of judicial or other official freedom which come into question, and
the two kinds are very different. It is a fact in our legal system that. judges
are by no means free to be arbitrary, and our vital need that they shall not be
free to be arbitrary has been caught into those rationales or doctrines about
"la,vs and not men, 1l and about " rules determining cases. 1l But it is also a fact
that our legal system does adjust to the individual case and to changes in our
conditions and institutions ; and that fact means that judges and other officials
are free to some real degree to be just and wise, and that we have a vital. need
that judges and other officials shall continue to be to some real degree free
to be ~vi.se and just. That fact happens, hm.rever, not to have been caught into an .
equally familiar, equally sharp~ or equally precious rationale or doctrine. Yet
it needs to be ; it is no less a vital part of our legal system and of our judges'
duty. There is the law, which we know as impersonal, and think of as clear ;

-
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there is the right outcome , which t"e fe e l as also impersonal , and think of as
hard to find, but capable of being found , and t h e office of the judge is to fulfill the demands of bot h.> together. !
Discuss
IV.

Height: 20 - Time :

36 minutes

"Run through the branches - or the budding tvligs - of the newer .J urispruthen , and you will see each one growing and hardening to become a good
spoke of the ~vheel ~ the branch of logical analysis . that of philosophical postulates, that of ethical values , that of the psychology and experimental logic
of judicial decision, that of reconvass of the concepts and principles of
any field of case-lay,]' , that of inquiry into the facts about the life under law
and of la~v' s effects on that life, that of the nature and vmrk of legal institutions, that of working principles of each one of the legal crafts, that of the
general p!1i1is ophy. of lail] ~ that of battle upon extravagant dictum - each seeks
to supplement the other in dealing Hith law ' s jobs of here and noY]. And no
particular writing comes into perspective until one notes t-Jhich , and how many,
of such spokes it is addressed to. "

dence ~

Discuss

